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The need for this study 
 
Background 
In 1995, the Clinton administration announced a goal of obtaining a 
homeownership rate of 67.5% by the year 2001.  While this was only an increase of 
around 1% over the existing rate, it meant an increase of hundreds of thousands of 
additional homeowners.  Most people with the financial means and interest in 
homeownership had already purchased a home.  Therefore, new homeowners would have 
to be low and moderate-income renters who had typically been unable to afford a home. 
This was one of a series of policy choices by many different actors in the 
mortgage industry.  Congressional acts have stimulated lending to low and moderate-
income populations.  In 1977, Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
to encourage financial institutions to lend to these populations.  The Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act of 1989 (HMDA) amended the CRA act, forcing financial institutions to 
report their lending practices and opening them to public scrutiny. 
Furthermore, the federal government has long provided incentives for 
homeownership.  The home mortgage interest deduction and the property tax deduction 
are by far the largest housing subsidies of the federal government.  They have been 
credited for creating wealth for generations of citizens and enlarging the middle-class.  
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has had a program 
called Federal Housing Administration (FHA) that subsidizes mortgage loans by 
providing full insurance on the lender losses on these loans, which creates a market for 
private entities to lend to lower-income persons.  The Veterans Administration has a 
similar mortgage insurance program for war veterans. 
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) increased their goals of purchasing loans 
made to low and moderate-income populations throughout the 1990’s.  The largest GSEs 
are Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”).  The 1992 Federal Housing Enterprise and 
Financial Safety and Soundness Act created a more ambitious plan for the Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to buy loans aimed at lower-income homeowners.  In addition to this, GSEs 
have purchased more of these loans because of the increase of these loans available as a 
result of CRA and HMDA.  Also, a 1995 HUD requirement sets targets for GSEs to 
purchase more loans targeted to low and moderate-income populations.  These actions have 
a strong impact on the lending industry.  Because most loans are sold to the secondary 
market, GSEs loan purchasing patterns have a strong impact on the origination of affordable 
loans. 
Adding these policy changes to the growing economy of the 1990’s, a substantial 
increase in homeownership resulted, especially an expansion in homeownership in lower-
income populations (McCarthy and Quercia 2000).  The rate of homeownership increased 
from 66.8% for the third quarter of 1995 to 68% during the third quarter of 2002.  An 
increase in minority homeownership helped boost this figure. 
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 To serve these lower-income populations, most lenders loosened their 
underwriting standards to lend funds in this new market.  However, in the past, 
perceptions of higher default rates and greater risk meant most lenders ignored this “sub-
prime” market.  Lenders would expect that lending to these new markets would result in 
higher delinquency, default, and foreclosure rates. 
Indeed, national statistics indicate that foreclosures are a growing problem.  For 
all mortgage types, the foreclosure rate for the third quarter of 2002 were 1.15%, the 
highest ever (Collins 2003.)  Typically the foreclosure rate of sub-prime, subsidized, and 
adjustable rate mortgages is even higher (GAO 2002).  This is due in part to the ability of 
a lender to cover its costs in foreclosure through the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) mortgage insurance, but may also reveal the increased risk of loans made to low 
and moderate-income persons. 
 There is evidence of a crisis in default and foreclosure on a regional and 
neighborhood level.  California has significantly higher rates of default than the nation at 
large.  Also, there are higher foreclosure rates on adjustable rate mortgages (GAO 2002).  
Chicago may have experienced foreclosures at a rate as high as 4.7% at the end of 2002, 
and this rate is even higher in many of its neighborhoods (Collins 2003).  With the 
economic slowdown of recent years, there is concern that these rates will rise even more. 
 
The importance of new research 
There is anecdotal evidence that foreclosure prevention counseling is effective in 
preventing foreclosures with troubled borrowers.  Given the slowing economy, the 
increase of loans to lower-income borrowers with less secure credit, and a general desire 
to sustain the achievement of the increase in homeownership, foreclosure prevention 
counseling (FPC) may play a more significant role in non-profit organizations in the 
future. 
New research on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of FPC is important to 
all stakeholders for multiple reasons.   First, it would help these stakeholders decide if 
FPC should be an important part of loan workout plans and non-profit housing programs.  
It could show that FPC could be an additional loss mitigation approach to the mortgage 
industry, providing the personal service that new technological advances cannot achieve.  
It may improve the cost-effectiveness of existing programs.  Second, it will help identify 
who benefits and pays the most in foreclosures, and thereby identify who should pay the 
costs of these programs.  Thirdly, it may help identify what elements and variables lead 
to successful FPC.  Most importantly, it may lead to reduced foreclosures, which would 
have an overall positive impact on the economy and benefit all stakeholders.   
While there are many stakeholders who incur costs in foreclosure, including the 
borrowers themselves, governments at different levels, and neighbors of the foreclosed 
property, this analysis will focus on the costs to the private mortgage industry, such as the 
lender, the private mortgage insurer, the servicer, and the secondary market investors.  
The purpose of this analysis is to understand and advance the current knowledge of the 
cost effectiveness of foreclosure prevention counseling.  It also will attempt to determine 
the extent to which the private mortgage industry should contribute to non-profit FPC 
programs and the ability of current research to convince the private mortgage industry to 
provide this funding. 
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Definitions of key terms 
Throughout this document, a number of terms are used.  Foreclosure prevention 
counseling refers to the work a non-profit organization does to prevent borrowers from 
involuntarily losing their homes.  Lenders are considered loan originators, who usually will 
sell their loan to investors.  These investors are Government Sponsored Enterprises, such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Servicers are for-profit organizations that “collect mortgage 
payments from borrowers and disburse those payments to lenders, local governments, and 
insurers” (Cordell and Cutts 2002).  Private mortgage insurers are companies that insure a 
portion of the loan, typically the first 20-25% of the loan value. 
 
Background on the foreclosure problem and foreclosure 
prevention counseling 
 
Foreclosures defined and its consequences to stakeholders 
Foreclosure is the “involuntarily relinquishing of rights to a property due to the 
inability to maintain financial obligations involved with homeownership” (Capone 1996).   
Only a small percentage of mortgage loans ever face foreclosure, but they represent the 
extreme cases of borrowers’ financial hardship. 
Foreclosures are extremely costly to all the stakeholders of a mortgage loan.  A 
borrower’s decision to default on its mortgage loan is determined in part by the costs that a 
foreclosure will have on the borrowers financial future.  The biggest loss may be the loss of 
equity in the residence.  Other costs include finding a new residence, damage to credit rating 
for up to 10 years, and possible psychological trauma (Capone 1996).  Lenders have an 
interest in preserving their loan assets and interest revenues.  Servicers want continued 
revenue from servicing the accounts.  Mortgage insurers, either public or private, face large 
insurance claims in foreclosures.  Local governments face the loss of tax revenues and often 
the deterioration of neighborhoods.  Owners of property near a foreclosed home often face 
a drop in their property values.  Non-profit organizations have an interest in serving people 
in need and their neighborhoods.  For example, Minneapolis’s Mortgage Foreclosure 
Prevention Program states as two of its goals “to stabilize neighborhoods by preventing 
vacant and boarded houses” and “to save public and private dollars by preventing 
foreclosure-related losses” (Moreno 1998). 
Recognizing these costs, the mortgage banking industry has designed a number of 
programs in an effort to reduce foreclosures.  The term for this the industry is called “loss 
mitigation.”  These programs provide servicers with a number of options to assist a 
defaulted borrower in avoiding foreclosure.   
There are two types of loss mitigation approaches to a defaulted loan.  One involves 
reinstating the loan, where the borrower and the servicer create an agreement to keep the 
borrower in the house.  The servicers will alter the terms of the loan so a borrower can 
restart payments.  There are myriad ways that is done.  One approach is forbearance, which 
suspends payments over a period of time.  This allows borrowers to solve other problems 
and begin repayment on a loan when their troubles have ceased.  These payments, both 
interest and principal are usually folded into principal and repaid over the term of the loan.  
Another method is loan restructuring.  This may mean lowering the monthly payment but 
extending the loan over a longer period of time, or it may mean reducing the interest rate.  If 
the loan is an FHA loan, the loan may be eligible for a partial claim workout.  The FHA will 
give the lender the amount necessary to cure the default and will execute a promissory note 
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with the borrower for this amount.  Payments on this loan may be deferred and may carry 
zero interest (Cordell and Cutts 2002). 
In the event of a default and extreme borrower hardship, some borrowers may not 
qualify for loan reinstatement and so may be unable to keep their homes.  Historically, 
foreclosure was a lender’s primary method of reducing its losses in these situations.  There 
are now other options instead of a foreclosure that can allow borrowers to relinquish their 
homes yet preserve some of their credit rating and reducing costs for the mortgage industry.  
The first method is called a “deed in lieu.”  This means that a borrower will “turn over the 
keys”, or transfer the title, to a lender in exchange for a release from the obligations under 
the mortgage.  The other method is a pre-foreclosure sale, where a borrower agrees to sell 
the house and pay off the mortgage and payments in arrears from the sale proceeds.  
Although these options are not available in every situation, both of these methods are more 
commonly used now than ever before (Capone 1996). 
Because few loan originators keep loans in their portfolios, secondary market policies 
have a significant effect on underwriting and granting mortgage loans.  The secondary 
market for mortgages places restrictions on restructuring loans that they keep in their 
portfolio.  Even though the secondary market has loosened restrictions on this in recent 
years, this still may provide limits on workout options. 
In recent years, technology has helped the mortgage industry reduce the number of 
foreclosures.  Over the last 20 years, loan servicers have developed and used computer 
software that performs an analysis of a borrower’s situation and evaluates factors such as 
payment history, credit ratings, and borrower financial situation.  These programs have 
proven successful in helping servicers and lenders to measure the risk of default, provide a 
framework to determine workout options, and determine a collection strategy (Cordell and 
Cutts 2002).  These technological innovations in the industry have reduced the number of 
foreclosures among their defaulted loans.  However, despite this reduction, the foreclosure 
rate continues to rise.   
 
Foreclosure Prevention Counseling by Non-Profit Organizations 
One additional resource to the stakeholders in a defaulted loan is foreclosure 
prevention programs.  Often, a lender will grant forbearance if a troubled borrower enters 
this counseling (Quercia et al. 1998).  This counseling provides individualized help from a 
person who wants to help and who usually does not have a financial stake in the loan.  A 
borrower in trouble may feel more comfortable talking to a counselor than a bank 
representative.  Also, as lenders used looser underwriting standards in their affordable 
housing lending, they used foreclosure prevention counseling to offset some of this risk 
(Quercia et al. 1998, Bunce 2002).  
Most post-purchase counseling starts when the borrower is in default (Wallach 
2001).  It is also offered across a variety of entities with much fragmentation (Moreno 1994).  
Formal training is relatively infrequent, with more resources going towards pre-purchase 
counseling (Quercia and Wachter 1996). 
Table 1 lists the elements of foreclosure prevention counseling.  Individual 
counseling is the primary method of assistance, either by phone or in person.  This aims to 
help borrowers understand their situation, to ensure that they understand and respond to 
bank correspondence, and to help them budget their expenses to continue making payments.  
Counseling can affect the default decision by helping the borrower understand these costs.  
It may also help homebuyers learn to make better decisions with their money, and to keep 
making payments in the event of a crisis (Quercia and Wachter 1996). 
 4 
Anecdotal evidence shows the success of post-purchase counseling if it starts early.  
For clients with whom they could intervene early, the Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention 
Program in Minneapolis and Saint Paul, Minnesota, was able to prevent foreclosure in half 
of the homeowners they counseled (Moreno 1998).  If a borrower waits too long to seek 
help, counselors may be unable to provide the assistance the borrower needs before 
foreclosure proceedings are completed. 
Often, a major role of a counselor is to serve as an intermediary between the 
borrower and lender (Quercia et al. 1998).  They also will refer borrowers to other services 
they may need to manage their finances or life circumstances.  Common partners include 
legal services and credit counseling agencies. 
 
Table 1: Elements In Foreclosure Prevention Counseling 
e
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 1. Counseling 
• Detecting delinquency early 
• Ensuring that households respond to notices 
• Assessing reasons for delinquency 
• Managing the crisis 
• Managing finances 
2. Budgeting 
• Providing financial training 
• Prioritizing spending 
3. Advocacy 
• Participating in and supporting client’s negotiations with lender/servicer 
4. Financial Assistance 
• Providing financial assistance to make mortgage payments or meet other financial 
emergencies 
5. Referral Network 
• Providing referrals to organizations that can provide assistance to households in dealing with 
issues that contribute to delinquency 
From: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  Home Ownership Education and Counseling  (2001)  
Many programs include financial assistance to help the borrower make payments in 
mergency situations.  These may include making a few payments for the borrower from a 
evolving fund, providing “silent” second mortgages, or granting new, lower interest rate 
oans to payoff the previous loan (Quercia and Wachter 1996). 
Unlike pre-purchase homeownership counseling, there are no standards for 
oreclosure prevention counseling.  These programs vary widely in content, focus, intensity, 
nd duration (Quercia and Wachter 1996).   
ho pays for foreclosure prevention counseling programs 
Formal HUD funding for FPC programs began in 1968 with the formation of HUD.  
ntil 1977, post-purchase counseling—which includes FPC—was the focus of the industry 
ecause of high foreclosure rates in HUD’s homeownership programs.  HUD began funding 
on-profit organizations to provide counseling in 1974 (McCarthy and Quercia 2000).  This 
unding continues today—for fiscal 2002, HUD appropriated $20 million for 
omeownership Education and Counseling (HEC).  In addition to HUD, private 
oundations and non-profits, and other governmental sources provide funds for foreclosure 
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prevention counseling.  Few in the private mortgage industry contribute substantially to 
these programs, but many refer their troubled borrowers for counseling. 
 
A critical evaluation of past studies 
 
Analyzing past studies 
Critical study issues 
A number of organizations have been trying to perform a conclusive study on the 
cost-effectiveness of FPC programs.  These efforts span thirty years, with a large number of 
studies performed between 1970 and 1980.  These studies, however, are flawed or not 
sufficiently comprehensive in scope to convince many stakeholders of counseling’s cost-
effectiveness. 
Table 2 lists a number of critical issues in the creation of a thorough empirical study 
of the cost-effectiveness of FPC programs.  One problem is creating a standard definition 
for success based on the goals for their program.  Most studies define counseling success as 
preventing a foreclosure on a home that would have otherwise happened if not for 
counseling.  However, in some cases, borrowers may prefer to give up their house, or 
counseling may focus on prosecuting a lender that used illegal lending practices. 
Another critical element is isolating the effects of FPC on a borrower’s ability to 
cure.  Counseling is always just one reason why a borrower cures.  It is often likely that an 
improvement in a borrower’s circumstances is the primary reason for a cure—for example, 
the borrower is able to find a job or is able to return to work after an illness.  Furthermore, 
offering financial assistance to a borrower may reduce the need for counseling.  In the 
Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Collaborative study, 95% of all borrowers who received 
financial assistance avoided foreclosure (MFPC 1994).  
Not only is isolating these problems difficult, but controlling for and identifying 
these other factors may also be challenging.  Factors such as a person’s temperament or the 
willingness of a family member to help may be hard to measure, identify, and record in a 
data set.  Using a multi-variate statistical analysis will have to include many factors that 
reflect other reasons for default, such as job history and income level.  Identifying the most 
critical variable may be difficult.  A random sample of participants may control against this, 
although it would be difficult to implement (Quercia and Wachter 1996).   
One recurring problem in the literature is the identification of an adequate control 
group.  Controlling for the above factors that influence a default decision, borrowers need to 
fall into two categories for comparison.  Many studies have compared borrowers who were 
referred for counseling versus those who were not referred, and then differentiating referred 
borrowers between those who were counseled or not.  Some of the studies listed below 
show the problems with this method.  However, this method was the only option for these 
studies because of available data. 
How a counseling agency determines who will get counseling may vary from 
provider to provider.  The borrower’s willingness to participate is a significant issue.  There 
may be differences in effort to avoid foreclosure under voluntary versus involuntary 
counseling programs.  Also, many counseling agencies screen potential clients so they can 
target their resources to particular persons.  For example, agencies may allow anyone to 
receive their services, or they may have a triage strategy, only helping the borrowers they 
think they can help.  Some providers, whose organization may originate or service loans, may 
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only provide counseling for their own customers, while other may only counsel HUD-
referred borrowers. 
Because there are no standards for counseling in foreclosure prevention, there is 
wide variation in counseling methods.  These methods may vary by site-to-site and even 
from one counseled borrower to the next.  Programs may vary in their use printed materials, 
the number of hours of counseling provided, the ability to provide financial assistance, and 
the number of counselors on staff.  One counseling provider may provide counseling by 
telephone and may counsel borrowers from different states, while another borrower may 
only provide face-to-face counseling.  Most programs provide counseling in both ways. 
 
Table 2: Critical problems in methodologies for measuring the success of homeownership 
counseling 
Problem Problem Description Sources 
Creating a firm 
definition of 
success 
There are different goals for counseling, so it may be difficult to 
measure success.  Most studies define counseling success as 
preventing a foreclosure on a home that would have otherwise 
happened if not for counseling.   
Mallach 2001 
Isolating 
counseling from 
other effects 
Ideally a study would like to determine that counseling was the single 
factor the helped prevent the default/foreclosure.  If this is not 
possible, identifying the degree to which counseling help may be 
useful.   
HUD 1983 
Controlling for 
and identifying 
exogenous 
factors 
Because so many factors influence a borrower’s ability to cure a 
default, such as an employment situation and ability to receive 
financial assistance, it is difficult to identify which factors should be 
included as control factors.  Furthermore, some of these factors may 
be difficult to identify. 
Abt proposal 1998, 
Mallach 2001 
Identifying a 
control group 
Ideally, two otherwise identical groups would be created: one who 
receives counseling and one who does not.  This may not ethically 
plausible.  Using quasi-experimental research designs may be easier 
to implement but the results may be less convincing. 
HUD 1983, 
Quercia and 
Wachter 1996, 
Mallach 2001 
Identifying who 
participates in 
counseling 
If the program is purely voluntary, then there will be selection bias in 
the data.  If it is compulsory, then many borrowers may be unwilling 
to use the help they receive.  Also, many counseling agencies screen 
potential counselees, perhaps focusing on the most needy or the 
ones mostly likely to benefit from help.  Another key difference is 
face-to-face counseling versus telephone counseling. 
HUD 1983 
Comparing the 
methods of each 
program 
Because there is so much variation in the type, methods, scope, and 
quality of foreclosure prevention counseling, it may be difficult to 
compare results across agencies. 
HUD 1983 
Comparing the 
qualifications 
and skills of the 
counselor 
Even if counseling agencies had similar methods and financial 
resources, there are many qualities of the counselor that are critical 
elements to the success of counseling.  These include a counselor’s 
education, people skills, accessibility to client, and number of 
professional contacts. 
Quercia and 
Wachter 1996 
Obtaining 
needed data 
There have been legal and methodological difficulties in past 
research to link lender/servicer data on troubled accounts with data 
on counseling for the owners of these accounts.  Data on many 
important factors may not be available. 
HUD 1983, 
Quercia and 
Wachter 1996, 
Mallach 2001 
Using a proper 
time period 
Many foreclosures can be prevented in the short-term but a few 
years later borrowers face troubles again.  The study needs to 
monitor the success of counseling over several years. 
Abt proposal 1998, 
Mallach 2001 
Obtaining an 
adequate sample 
size 
Given the possible variations given above, a large sample size is 
needed to provide significant results for all variables. 
Abt proposal 1998 
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A related issue is the competence of the counselor.  Counselors vary in education, 
training, available time, relationship skills, and professional connections.  Some of these 
qualities are difficult to measure.  All of these factors will influence the counselor’s ability to 
assist the troubled borrower.  The competence variable may vary from site to site, counselor 
to counselor, and from borrower to borrower. 
Data collection has been one of the biggest reasons for the limited reliability and 
generalizability of past studies.  There are few data sources that include data that combines 
both counseling and account history, so these data must be collected from different sources 
and linked together.  A study attempted by the American Homeowner Education and 
Counseling Institute (AHECI) reveals strong legal challenges to releasing borrower 
information.  Furthermore, many data are difficult to quantify but are critical in determining 
the efficacy of counseling.  Also, due to the cost, time, and expertise required to maintain a 
database, many non-profit providers do not collect data on their counseling efforts.  When 
they do, these data may be incomplete or poorly maintained.  Lenders may also be unwilling 
to share data on their customers and their lending practices for business reasons.  As a result 
of these issues, past data will unlikely be adequate to perform a thoroughly rigorous study of 
counseling, so new data will need to be created before a study can be performed (Quercia 
and Wachter 1996).   
Many past studies fail to examine counseling results over a long enough time period.  
Many studies show that most foreclosures occur within three to five years after loan 
origination (Quercia and Wachter 1996).  Evidence also shows that many borrowers, even if 
they can stave off foreclosure once, face trouble again several years later (FPC 1994, Moreno 
1995).  A long-term horizon is needed to determine if counseling is successful. 
One last problem is obtaining a sufficient sample size.  Because there are so many 
variables in measuring counseling success, obtaining a sufficiently large sample to control for 
all of these is important.  However, many counseling agencies do not counsel a large number 
of persons, so obtaining a sufficiently large sample may be difficult. 
 
Studies performed before 1983 
A 1983 HUD publication, A Report to Congress on Housing Counseling, describes and 
summarizes over a decade of studies on the issue.  The report’s conclusion states that results 
of these studies are mixed on the effectiveness of FPC.  In general, the studies show 
problems in ways listed above.  The data and methodologies of some of these studies raised 
questions about the reliability and generalizability of these results (HUD 1983).  As a whole, 
these reports are inconclusive due to their limited scope and numerous flaws. 
 The first study was performed by the Organization for Social and Technical 
Innovation (OSTI) in 1974.  It evaluated delinquent borrowers in the Section 235 and 237 
programs from 31 agencies nationwide.  It found that counseling had a modest effect on 
avoiding mortgage failures, and these results varied widely by program and city.  A major 
weakness of this study is that it compared defaulted borrowers in cities with counseling 
programs versus those cities without counseling—it did not consider many of the variables 
listed above, such as socio-economic factors and counseling methods, to accurately compare 
these programs.  Data collection problems also taint the reliability of this study (HUD 1983). 
 HUD tried to improve on the OSTI study in a study called Counseling for Delinquent 
Mortgagors in 1975.  This study compared referred and non-referred borrowers, and, of those 
that were referred, counseled and non-counseled.  It tried to incorporate socio-economic 
data.  It found that troubled borrowers who were referred to a HUD-sponsored counseling 
program faced foreclosure at a rate of 16% less often than those who were not referred.  
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The results of the cost-benefit analysis showed that counseling was cost-effective for HUD.  
The data used for this study was the same as the OSTI study; again, data reliability raises 
questions about the results (HUD 1983).   
 Two years later, HUD released another study, Counseling for Delinquent Mortgagors II, 
which, despite its name, is unrelated to the former study.  It attempted to correct some of 
the data problems of the first in several ways, most notably by creating control groups within 
the same city.  It found that referred borrowers experienced fewer foreclosures than non-
referred borrowers, like the previous study.  Results also showed that, among the referred 
borrowers, those who received counseling had similar rates of foreclosure to those who did 
not receive it.  Success varied widely by city and program.  Because of data restrictions, the 
results cannot be generalized beyond the 5 cities studied (HUD 1983). 
 In 1980, the National Urban League’s study, called Report of Home Mortgage Assignment 
Counseling, found that counseling had mixed results, even finding that some groups of 
borrowers who received counseling had a greater rate of foreclosure than those who did not.  
They surmised that only the most desperate cases were referred for counseling, although the 
foreclosure rates decreased the longer the borrowers remained in counseling.  The study did 
indicate that, overall, the program was cost effective for HUD (HUD 1983).  The study had 
a litany of methodological problems, including not controlling for large difference in 
programs in different cities and using a short time frame.  Furthermore, changes in the HUD 
program over the study period were not reflected in the study methods. 
 Lastly, a 1980 study focused on default counseling in Detroit.  Results showed that in 
Detroit foreclosure rates were higher for counseled borrowers.  Default rates were about the 
same for both groups.  They did not attempt to measure the programs cost-effectiveness 
(HUD 1983). Problems with the study included large gaps of missing data and the lack of 
randomness in sampling. 
 
A recent study 
The only study attempted to measure the success and cost-effectiveness of FPC in 
the last twenty years was performed by Ana Moreno for the Mortgage Foreclosure 
Prevention Program in Minneapolis and Saint Paul, Minnesota.  This study found that FPC 
was cost-effective for all stakeholders in the aggregate (See Figure 1).  The study used two 
scenarios that could have happened in a foreclosure.  The first measured the costs of a 
foreclosure where the house was sold and the mortgage had private mortgage insurance.  
The second scenario had a FHA insured mortgage that was not resold and instead 
abandoned, leaving the care of the property to the city.  Total mortgage foreclosure costs 
under the first scenario were $26,600 and $73,300 under the second.  The cost of counseling 
per household served was calculated at $3,300, which includes the costs of providing both 
counseling services and financial assistance.  See Figures 1 and 2 for the results of this study.  
The study recommends mortgage lenders provide more funding to foreclosure prevention 
counseling programs to benefit their customers (Moreno 1995). 
 The first scenario is the most typical for the private mortgage industry as a whole, 
but for loans to low- and moderate-income persons, many are insured through government 
insurance programs such as FHA and the Veteran’s Association (VA).  In the first scenario, 
aggregate costs to all stakeholders are much less than the costs of the counseling 
assistance—the total lender and servicer cost was only $2,300 per foreclosure, less than the 
$3,300 cost per successful counseling effort.  Therefore, it makes little sense for these 
companies to pay for FPC themselves.  Unless all stakeholders pay their share of funding 
foreclosure prevention programs, lenders have little incentive to pay for their share of the 
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costs.  The study suggests that if all stakeholders contributed in proportion to the total cost, 
all stakeholders would benefit.  
 
Figure 1: Costs of foreclosure - privately insured, with resale of property 
 
Source: Ana Moreno.  Cost Effectiveness of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention, 1995. 
 
 There are several other limitations on this study.  The $3,300 cost was based on 
short-term results of preventing a foreclosure.  Nearly half of counseled borrowers who 
avoided foreclosure faced it again within two years.  Using the number of borrowers who 
avoided foreclosures over two years, the costs per successful counseling effort were $6,500, 
nearly twice the short-term amount.  Using a long-term approach proves a better measure of 
counseling success, so this higher figure is more accurate. 
 The study assumed that counseling was the main reason that everyone avoided 
foreclosure.  Many of the HUD studies above indicated that counseling was only one reason 
for curing a default.  This study did not have a control group to isolate the effectiveness of 
counseling alone, nor did it consider other socio-economic factors.  If, conservatively, 
counseling was the primary reason for the prevention of 50% of the foreclosures over two 
years, then the cost per prevented foreclosure was $13,000.  This is significantly higher than 
the lenders costs—yet still well below the aggregate costs. 
 The data used to calculate the costs of stakeholders and the costs of the counseling 
program were not linked.  Therefore, the study does not determine if these foreclosure costs 
would be the actual costs to foreclose on these troubled borrowers.  The assumption that 
these troubled borrowers would face these foreclosure costs is conjecture. 
This study only examined one counseling program.  As described above, there are 
many variances in this counseling across programs and cities, so these results cannot be 
generalized beyond this one program in Minneapolis/St. Paul. 
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Figure 2: Costs of foreclosure with FHA insurance, no sale and property abandoned 
 
Source: Ana Moreno.  Cost Effectiveness of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention, 1995. 
 
Devising a methodology for the study of the cost-effectiveness 
of foreclosure prevention counseling 
 
Creating a methodology 
 Because of the weaknesses of past studies and the importance of this issue, new 
studies are needed to properly evaluate the cost-effectiveness of foreclosure prevention 
counseling.  Based on an evaluation of past studies, a review of the existing literature, and an 
understanding of research design, a far-reaching, comprehensive method is essential to get 
persuasive results. 
A critical element of a new study would be to create firm definitions and measures 
for the critical variables, grounded in observation and the literature.  There are two sides to 
this study.  One is examining the counseling efforts at the counseling provider.  The other is 
examining the lender’s loan activity and collection efforts.   
From the counseling provider perspective, these organizations attempt to prevent 
foreclosures while using their resources efficiently and wisely.  Therefore, a study should 
measure the counseling provider’s ability to prevent foreclosures and the cost associated 
with a prevented foreclosure. 
The lender is usually interested in preventing a foreclosure because the foreclosure 
costs are usually very high.  Providing a good calculation of these costs, especially 
considering the borrower’s circumstances, is critical in the effectiveness determination.  
Furthermore, determining and measuring the lender’s approach to mitigating losses is 
important as well. 
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Measuring a counseling provider’s costs of preventing a foreclosure 
 
Creating a measure for the cost of preventing a foreclosure 
There are two variables to determine the costs of a foreclosure prevention program.  
One is identifying the actual expenses of the program.  This may be one of the more 
straightforward parts of this study.  See Table 3 for a list of these costs.  The costs of staff 
time, materials, marketing, and outside resources are the primary expenses.  If a program has 
funds specifically designated for FPC, and these funds are used exclusively for FPC, the 
study may simply take these total costs and divide them by the number of “successful” 
counselees to determine the cost.  In other cases, where counseling costs are paid from other 
restricted funds, a more specific itemization of costs will be necessary (See Table 3.) 
 
Table 3: Costs of foreclosure prevention counseling 
 
Type of cost Proposed measure Comments 
Costs of staff time Use salaries of staff time and how much time they 
allocate to foreclosure prevention counseling 
These costs needed to be adjusted 
for inflation and regional 
differences 
Cost of facilities 
and overhead 
Use actual expenses, allocated by time (such as 
phone) or square feet (facility space) 
These costs needed to be adjusted 
for inflation and regional 
differences 
Costs of 
management time 
Determine how much time they allocate to 
foreclosure prevention counseling 
These costs needed to be adjusted 
for inflation and regional 
differences 
Costs of materials 
and speakers 
Use actual expenses These costs needed to be adjusted 
for inflation and regional 
differences 
Promotion and 
marketing costs 
Use actual expenses These costs needed to be adjusted 
for inflation and regional 
differences 
Opportunity cost 
of not using these 
funds for other 
purposes 
None – probably will be unable to evaluate. For funds used for counseling that 
are unrestricted, the opportunity 
cost of not using these funds for 
other purposes in the organization 
is important 
 
The second cost is the cost to estimate a prevented foreclosure for the program 
provider.  However, this is more difficult in that it requires a definition of a successful 
counseling effort.  This will require a strict definition of success.  As described above, one 
critical measure is isolating the other effects that allow a delinquent borrower from avoiding 
foreclosure.   
In the Moreno study cited above, a successful outcome was only a short-term result.  
It took the total program costs divided by the number of foreclosure it was able to prevent 
in the short-term.  The program costs was significantly smaller using this measure than a 
longer-term measure, which found that many borrowers faced foreclosure again in a few 
years. 
A long-term approach is essential.  While there are clearly many benefit from 
preventing a foreclosure in the short-term, counseling seeks to produce long-term results—
to prevent a foreclosure permanently.  There are savings to all parties in the short-term, but 
in many cases these costs will increase for many stakeholders if there is simply a delay of a 
few years. 
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Measuring the costs of foreclosures to lenders/investors 
 Lender and investors in mortgage loans face numerous foreclosure costs.  See table 4 
for a list of these costs.  The challenge with this study will be to provide a reliable estimate of 
the costs of a foreclosure, given a borrower’s profile, even if the person avoids foreclosure.  
It is important to mention that in some instances, borrowers may avoid foreclosure 
proceedings by offering to relinquish the title to their home through a deed in lieu or pre-
foreclosure sale, which may significantly reduce these costs below. 
 
Table 4: Foreclosure costs for lenders/owners of loan (e.g. GSEs) 
Type of cost Cost Comments 
Legal Lawyers’ fees This cost will be highest in judicial foreclosure states 
   
Administrative Costs of collections and staff 
time to initiate and manage 
foreclosure process 
 
   
   
Financial Loss of accrued 
interest/principal after sale of 
property 
Mortgage insurance, especially when the insurer is HUD 
through the VA or the FHA, will cover much of this cost.  
A delinquency judgment may reduce or eliminate this cost. 
 Opportunity costs of delays in 
courts 
This represents the cost of reinvesting the funds in another 
loan. 
 Loss of interest revenue This may be a benefit—if current interest rates are higher 
than the rate of the initial loan, the lender may profit from 
reloaning the funds 
   
   
Property 
Related 
Management of foreclosed 
property 
Includes property management staff  
 Repair and maintenance costs Properties obtained through foreclosure often require 
significant repairs before the lender can resell them 
 Property taxes and insurance  
 Administrative costs  
 Selling costs These include closing costs, realtor fees, and in some states, 
a real estate transfer tax 
 
 
     The most significant factor in foreclosure costs for a lender is time.  Generally, a 
lender will make every effort to foreclose and take hold of the property as quickly as 
possible.  In times of a depressed housing market, the lender may decide to own and manage 
the property until housing prices increase.  In each situation, time will have an effect on the 
costs.  The effect of time is discussed under the description of each cost below. 
 
Types of costs 
 Lost interest and principal is one cost to lenders.  Not only do they lose these costs 
upon foreclosure, but also, with the passing of time during the foreclosure process, these 
costs accrue because they cannot re-lend these funds to someone who will pay timely.  
Prevailing interest rates also may affect costs.  That is, lenders may lose money when they 
lend the proceeds of a foreclosure sale at a lower rate than that of the previous loan (or gain 
if interest rates have increased). 
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 Lenders incur costs in owning the property.  Often, once borrowers realize they will 
lose their house to foreclosure, they will cease performing needed maintenance on the house.  
Also, these properties may be vacant for months before the lender can obtain title.  
Therefore, repairs are usually required before the house can be resold.  There are additional 
costs in managing the property, insurance and taxes, and selling costs.  Selling costs may 
include a realtor commission and a real estate transfer tax in some locations.  Of course, the 
longer the lender owns the property before a sale, the greater these costs. 
 There are a number of factors that affect the sale of the house.  In a down economy, 
foreclosures may increase due to a loss of jobs, potentially causing a large number of 
foreclosures in certain neighborhoods or regions.  In this case, the real estate market may 
become depressed and reduce the liquidity and the sale proceeds of properties obtained 
through foreclosure (Springer and Waller 1993).  In most cases, properties are sold at 
foreclosure auctions, usually to private investors that specialize in rehabilitating and reselling 
these properties.  A house that has faced foreclosure often faces a stigma in the marketplace, 
often discounting the sale by five percent.  This reduces the price that these private investors 
are willing to bid at auction and therefore reduces the proceeds of the foreclosure sale.  
Therefore, houses usually do not sell at market value (Capone 1996). 
 
Legal considerations 
 Foreclosure laws vary widely by state.  While there are many variations, there are 
three differences in types of statutes and regulations that affect foreclosure costs.  These 
differences are the legal method of transferring the title to the lender, the right to redeem, 
and existence of deficiency judgments.  A study by Philips and Rosenblatt determined that 
these three changes in laws have a significant effect on the costs of a foreclosure.  When 
foreclosure costs are lower, it may decrease a lender’s willingness to risk a workout plan with 
a borrower; conversely, if costs are higher, the lender may be eager to pursue workout 
options to avoid foreclosure (Philips and Rosenblatt 1997). 
 Different states have different procedures to transfer the title to the lender.  One is 
judicial and the other is “power of sale”.  Briefly, the judicial process requires court approval 
to take property of the house.  In a “power of sale” system, a trustee takes possession of the 
title and sells it.  Judicial processes take much longer than power of sale foreclosures because 
they must enter long court proceedings, thereby increasing the costs to lenders (Philips and 
Rosenblatt 1997). 
 In some states, a borrower has a “right of redemption” period.  This gives the 
borrower a fixed amount of time after the initiation of the foreclosure proceedings to pay all 
the principal, accrued interest, and lender costs before a foreclosure can occur.  This limit 
varies very widely by state and can be up to 180 days.  Philips and Rosenblatt found that the 
longer this period, the greater the costs to the lender (Philips and Rosenblatt 1997.) 
 The existence of a deficiency judgment also affects a lender’s costs.  This judgment 
allows a lender the right to collect additional funds from the borrower’s assets if the 
proceeds from the sale of the foreclosed property fail to the cover the remaining principal 
and accrued costs.  Where this exists, borrowers have increased risk from foreclosure and 
may be less motivated to pursue a workout plan (Philips and Rosenblatt 1997). 
 Bankruptcy law creates another potential problem for lenders.  Borrowers facing 
foreclosure may file for bankruptcy, which creates a stay on collection efforts, meaning that 
lenders must cease all collection efforts, including foreclosure proceedings, until the court 
gives its approval (Springer and Waller 1993). 
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Important study considerations 
 As mentioned earlier, getting an accurate measure of these costs may prove difficult.  
First, few lenders may be willing to provide all of these data for privacy and competitive 
reasons.  Second, it may be difficult and time consuming to measure the costs of a defaulted 
loan if the borrower cures.  For example, finding a sale price on a foreclosed property may 
require some analysis of the local real estate market.  In addition, the study will have to 
control for the variations in foreclosure laws across different states.   
 The circumstances surrounding the loan may have a significant effect on their desire 
to pursue a loan workout.  For example, if the borrower lives in a power of sale state with 
deficiency judgment, a lender may be more interested in pursuing foreclosure than for a 
borrower in a judicial foreclosure state and with a depressed research market.  A rigorous, 
sound study will control for these factors.  A study would also need to control for a change 
in the interest rates, as this also may have an effect on foreclosure trends. 
 There is a list of other borrower characteristics that will useful to collect.  All of 
these factors are correlated with a borrower’s ability to repay a loan over time.  These include 
the initial loan-to-value ratio of the house, the rate of appreciation in house value, the age of 
house, the presence of second and third mortgages, among others (Elmer and Seelig 1998).  
While studies have not yet shown these to be causal variables in foreclosure but instead are 
merely correlated to foreclosure rates, these data will be collected if available to make a more 
complete and robust data set. 
 
An expansion of study results 
 
Expanding the Moreno study 
 Existing literature can provide a basis for expanding on the Moreno study 
described above, “Cost Effectiveness of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention.”  The 
following discussion will attempt to improve on the shortcomings of Moreno’s analysis 
in an attempt to better evaluate of counseling’s cost-effectiveness.  This analysis will 
expand upon Moreno’s two scenarios.  The first measured the costs of a foreclosure 
where the house was sold and the mortgage was privately insured and the second 
measured the costs of a house that was insured by the FHA but abandoned and not resold 
by the lender.  The focus will be on private, for-profit interests in the mortgage industry, 
including lenders, servicers, private mortgage insurers, and secondary market investors.  
These will collectively be referred to as the lender for this analysis. 
In the HUD report, “Providing Alternatives to Mortgage Foreclosure: A Report to 
Congress,” the author delineates a typical lender’s foreclosure costs.  The study provides 
costs under three different assumptions based on the length of the holding period.  As 
described above, time is the largest factor in the costs of a foreclosure to the lender. 
Differences in state law change this time variable, so using a delay similar to that of 
Minnesota’s (where most of Moreno’s data was collected) this study can estimate the 
costs of a foreclosure using the HUD model. 
Unfortunately, the Moreno study fails to describe the lender’s estimated costs of 
foreclosure in detail, so a direct evaluation of the study’s assumptions cannot be 
performed.  It does tell us the following facts: the average assessed market value of the 
house was $55,400, the average homeowner had lived in their house for seven years, the 
average housing payment was $552, and the average total of payments in arrears was 
$3000.  It also states that the average holding period was 9 months before the sale.   
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However, the current analysis assumes that the costs due to losses in interest will be less 
now than in 1995, when the study was published, due to changes in market conditions.  
Also, the current analysis will assume that about $50 dollars of the housing payment was 
for utilities, insurance, and property taxes.  Using those figures and assuming an 8% 
interest rate and a 95% loan-to-value ratio at origination, the original loan amount was 
$71,000 and the purchase price was approximately $75,000. 
 Moreno calculated the costs per successful counseling effort as $3,300 per effort.  
A successful counseling effort is defined a series of counseling sessions with a borrower 
who had defaulted on a mortgage, that resulted with the borrower avoiding foreclosure 
and reinstating the mortgage, and remained in the house for over two years afterwards.  
From the analysis earlier in this paper, however, a figure of $13,000 is more accurate 
because it includes both the long-term success and an allowance for other reasons for 
curing a default.  In the following scenarios, this $13,000 figures is used for a comparison 
to lender foreclosure costs. 
  
Scenario one – sale of property with private mortgage insurance 
See exhibit 5 for the calculation of revised foreclosure costs based one of 
Moreno’s scenarios—a default resulting in a foreclosure sale with private mortgage 
insurance.  This schedule is adapted from the HUD model, which is a standard 
calculation that lenders and services use to estimate the cost of a foreclosure (Capone 
1996).  The table shows the assumptions that there was a decrease in assessed value of 
$6173 after the lender paid for repairs before sale.  Furthermore, it shows that the 
principal balance was $6580 greater than the assessed value before repairs.  These results 
may occur in the most depressed neighborhoods, in which many of the counseled 
borrowers in Moreno’s study may reside. 
The Moreno study, as shown in Figure 1 earlier in the document, foreclosure 
costs—for the private mortgage companies, including the lender, servicer, mortgage 
company, and secondary market investor—was approximately $19,300.  The calculation 
in Table 5 shows costs of $16,976.  The difference between the calculations in Table 5 
and Moreno’s study may be explained by lower interest rates.  The calculations in Table 
5 use conservative figures, such as showing depreciation in home value and a lower 
original loan balance.  As Moreno notes, these figures do not include certain 
administrative and staff costs that lenders have, such as collections staff and real estate 
managers. 
 
Scenario Two – FHA insured, no foreclosure sale, property is abandoned 
Moreno’s other scenario involves a sale that is insured through the FHA and 
becomes abandoned.  The cost of a foreclosure in this scenario is approximately $73,300 
to all the stakeholders in aggregate—much greater than the first scenario.  A large 
number of loans in her study were insured through the FHA and the VA.  The private 
mortgage industry loses less in this scenario because of generous federal FHA insurance 
claim payments.  Again, the costs are not detailed in Moreno’s study, but the reader may 
assume that the losses to lenders and the FHA are greater than the other scenario because 
repairs do not add value to the house because there is no sale (see table 5.) 
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Table 5: Scenario One - Calculation of Foreclosure Costs 
Values at Loan Origination    
 House Price   $        71,579   
 Loan Amount (95% LTV)             68,000   
     
Values at Loan Default (7 years after origination)    
 House Value             55,400   
 Add: value added from repairs             10,000   
 Less: Loan Amount (7%, 30 yr., fixed rate loan)            (61,980)  
 Proceeds from Foreclosure Sale            3,420  
     
 Drop in home value from foreclosure sale               6,179   
 Difference in mortgage and assessed value              (6,580)  
     
Expenses That Are Independent of Holding Period    
 Property Rehabilitation (8% of full house value) 8.0%             5,232   
 Attorney, Title, and Transfer Fees (3.2%) 3.2%             2,093   
 Realty Commission on Final Sale (6%) 6.0%             3,924   
 Contribution Toward Buyer Closing Costs (3%) 3.0%             1,962   
 Total Cost             13,211   
     
Expenses during nine month holding period   
 Payments in arrears (6 payments)               2,714   
 Lost interest during period               3,235   
 Property taxes, hazard insurance,    
    and maintenance (0.21%/month) 0.21%             1,236   
 Holding Period Costs               7,185   
 Total Cost          20,396  
 Gain/(Loss) on Foreclosure        (16,976) 
Source: Adapted from “Providing Alternatives to Mortgage Foreclosure”, HUD 1996. 
 
Table 6: Scenario Two – FHA insured, no sale 
Values at Loan Origination    
 House Price   $        71,579   
 Loan Amount (95% LTV)             68,000   
     
Values at Loan Default (7 years after origination)    
 House Value                     -    
 Add: value added from repairs                     -    
 Less: Loan Amount (7%, 30 yr., fixed rate loan)            (61,980)  
 Proceeds from Foreclosure Sale        (61,980)
     
 Drop in home value from foreclosure sale             71,579   
 Difference in mortgage balance and assessed value            (61,980)  
     
Other expenses/benefits 9   
 Payments in arrears (6 payments)               2,714   
 Reimbursement on insurance (90% of loan balance) 90%           55,782   
 Benefit from transferring property to city (accrued taxes) 0.21% 698.04       59,195 
 Gain/(Loss) on Foreclosure          (2,786)
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A Third Scenario – Deed-in-lieu or foreclosure sale 
A third scenario is needed.  The literature states that there has been an increase in 
deed-in-lieu and pre-foreclosure sales.  This option cuts the costs of the lender 
considerably and provides an alterative to foreclosure.  See Table 7 for a calculation of 
these costs to the lender.  These costs are significant less than in the other two scenarios.  
Of course, this option is not always available or desirable.  A borrower has to agree to 
them and the market has to be strong enough for the property to sell. 
 
Table 7: Scenario 3 - Lender losses in a pre-foreclosure sale 
Values at Loan Origination    
 House Price   $        71,579  
 Loan Amount (95% LTV)             68,000  
     
Values at Loan Default (7 years after origination)    
 House Value             55,400  
 Less: Loan Amount (7%, 30 yr., fixed rate loan)            (61,980)  
 Proceeds from Foreclosure Sale          (6,580) 
     
 Drop in home value from foreclosure sale             16,179  
 Difference in mortgage balance and assessed value              (6,580) 
     
 Payments in arrears (6 payments)           (2,714) 
 Gain/(Loss) on Foreclosure          (9,295) 
 
Analysis 
These revised numbers present a less convincing case for the cost-effectiveness of 
FPC than Moreno’s study.  Both the cost per effective counseling effort and the costs of 
foreclosure are understated in the Moreno study.  Under scenario one, the study shows 
that private industry would benefit if they paid for their own counseling program, in that 
the costs of the counseling would result in a reduction of foreclosures and its costs.  
However, under scenarios two and three, lenders would not benefit as much from 
contributing to FPC programs.  Because of the FHA insurance, much of the private 
lender’s costs are recovered through insurance claims.  Scenario three shows that using 
the loss mitigation techniques of deed in lieu and pre-foreclosure sales, their costs are 
below the cost of counseling.  In these scenarios, the lender would benefit by paying its 
pro-rata costs of the counseling in conjunction with the other stakeholders. 
This analysis only reflects the costs to the private mortgage industry.  Other costs, 
such as emotional pain to homeowners, family stress, costs to the city, and costs to their 
neighborhood, are all important.  If the aggregate costs are considered, FPC may be cost-
effective in most foreclosure situations.  Much anecdotal evidence shows that FPC 
improves the lives of many borrowers and complements other supportive services for 
low- and moderate-income persons.  This analysis does not attempt to show a failure of 
FPC or discourage the use of FPC.  However, this study fails to convince private industry 
that they should bear some of the costs of FPC and focus less time and research on loss 
mitigation techniques. 
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Future research 
 The above analysis cannot overcome many of the shortcomings of Moreno’s 
study, and more research is necessary to provide a more defensible analysis for the cost-
effectiveness of FPC.   
Ideally, a study that provided a long-term, comprehensive analysis of this issue 
would be the best solution.  However, based on all the challenges that researchers would 
have to overcome, it is unlikely to happen soon.  
 The needed study would be extremely expensive, perhaps prohibitively so.  It would 
require a long-term commitment of many players, including researchers, lenders/servicers, 
counselors, and counseling organizations.  It would require a significant level of cooperation 
with lenders and servicers, but according to Mallach, there is little interest for lenders to 
support this type of research (Mallach 2001).  There are no existing data sources that could 
provide all the data that this study requires.  To get the most conclusive and best empirical 
results possible, a data set will need to be created before any analysis is done, and 
collaboration with lenders and servicers will be required to collect this data.   
Given these challenges, a more modest study may provide useful results.  A 
natural extension of this research is to do similar work on pre-purchase homeownership 
counseling to see if that has an effect on default and foreclosure through educating people 
on how to manage homeownership responsibilities, on determining if homeownership is 
the best decision for them, and avoiding loans that carry overly burdensome terms. 
These analyses study measures the quantitative result of FPC.  However, there are 
intangible results that also motivate non-profits to have these program, such as building self-
esteem, increasing civic involvement, and improving family life skills (Mallach 2001).  
Measuring these more qualitative results would supplement the research of this study.  Some 
results that could be quantified, such as the ability of homeowners to reduce their debt load 
or to implement better spending habits, could also be examined. 
This study focuses on the lenders and investors in mortgage loans.  A more 
exhaustive study that includes other stakeholders, including costs and benefits to mortgage 
insurers, the governments, neighborhoods, and the borrowers themselves would provide a 
broader understanding of the cost-effectiveness of FPC.  
There are some costs and benefits that deserve a thorough analysis, yet should be 
beyond the scope of this study.  One is an empirical evaluation on the cost of foreclosures 
on neighborhood property values.  Studies such as these could provide a cost figure for 
some of the costs that are not measured in this study and make this analysis more robust. 
There are other related issues that are beyond the scope of this study but that have 
a significant impact on foreclosures and foreclosure prevention.  These include predatory 
lending; consumer credit policies; and race, age, and socio-economic biases in lending 
practice.  Studies on how these impact the foreclosures and foreclosure prevention could 
add to this body of literature. 
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